The High Court of Delhi[1] is of the view that the inquiry proceedings cannot be quashed merely because ICC failed to complete inquiry proceedings with the time frame of 90 days.
In the present case the petitioner, who is a qualified CA, has received a hearing notice by email dated 23.12.2022 from ICC constituted under the POSH Act, to appear in person before it on 06.01.2023 at 02.30 PM in connection with an inquiry under Section 11 of the said act against him, as a complaint had been registered against him on 03.06.2022. Prior to this a similar complaint dated 24.03.2022 was made by the respondent no. 4 under POSH Act but no action has been taken even after lapse of more than 60 days.
Aggrieved by this the petitioner has filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi for seeking relief:
- By quashing the impugned hearing notice by the email dated 23.12.2022.
- Issue writ/ order/direction against the Respondents by quashing the impugned unsigned complaint dated 03.06.2022.
- Issue writ/ order/direction against the Respondents in the facts and circumstances of the case, causing serious harassment and to malign the reputation of the Petitioner
Facts:
The grievance of the petitioner is that a subsequent complaint has now been filed by the petitioner, the said complaint is undated. He submits that the second complaint filed is on the same subject and pertains to the alleged incident which is the subject matter of the complaint dated 03.06.2022 and he contends that that two proceedings with regard to the same incident are not permissible in law. Also the inquiry had to be completed within a period of 90 days and that as 90 days have elapsed from the date of the complaint dated 03.06.2022, the entire proceedings of the ICC are vitiated.
Reference was made to the decision of the High Court of Tripura in Vinay Kumar Rai Vs. The Union of India and Ors., W.P.(C) 596/2019,
“Section (4) of Section 11 nowhere provides the consequences for not completing the inquiry within ninety days. Ordinarily as per the principles of statutory interpretation when a provision which provides for a time limit is not coupled with any penal or adverse consequences in completing the task so envisaged under the statue, is not considered mandatory.
In any case, it would be wholly illogical that for the inability of the committee to complete the inquiry into the complaint of sexual harassment the aggrieved person would suffer the fate of the complaint being terminated without conclusion.
In plain terms, the legislative intent is very clear namely that such complaint should be treated with seriousness and should be completed as soon as possible so that if the allegations are correct the aggrieved person may get justice and respite from further harassment and if allegations are found to be untrue the person against whom such complaint is made may get honourable exoneration. However, this time limit provided in sub-section (4) of Section 11 cannot be seen as a terminal point beyond which the inquiry cannot continue.”
Conclusion:
The committees like the ICC functions on the principal of natural justice and the time period of 90 days is to ensure that timely justice is provided to the victim. Therefore the period of 90 days cannot be a terminal point beyond which the inquiry is terminated.
[1] CA Nitish Parashar v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India ICAI & ORS., W.P.(C) 88/2023
DUCTUS EDGE 