Consent Managers under India’s DPDP Act

Nov 18, 2026 · @Dixit Mehta, Ductus Legal

By Ductus Legal, Data Privacy Practice

Since 13 November 2026, companies can apply to the Data Protection Board of India to register as Consent Managers under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act). Applications are made through a portal at dpbi.gov.in, which the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) announced on 14 November 2026. This is the second phase of DPDP implementation. The core obligations of Data Fiduciaries, the rights of Data Principals and the Board’s penalty powers follow on 13 May 2027. This article explains what a Consent Manager is, how it works in practice and who pays for it. It also examines the practical challenges that will decide whether it succeeds.

What is a Consent Manager?

A Consent Manager is a company registered with the Board. Through its platform, an individual (the Data Principal) can give, manage, review and withdraw consent in a way that is accessible, transparent and interoperable. It acts on behalf of the individual and is accountable to them, not to the companies whose consents it handles. The framework rests on sections 2(g), 6(7) to 6(9) and 27(1)(d) of the DPDP Act, Rule 4 of the DPDP Rules, 2025, and the First Schedule to the Rules.

To register, an applicant must be a company incorporated in India with a net worth of at least ₹2 crore. It must have adequate technical, operational and financial capacity, and its management must be of fairness and integrity. Conflict-of-interest safeguards must be written into its memorandum and articles. It also needs independent certification that its platform meets the Board’s interoperability standards.

Once registered, a Consent Manager must ensure that personal data shared through it is not readable by it. It must keep records of consents given, denied and withdrawn, and of data shared between companies, for at least seven years, and give individuals access to those records. It must act in a fiduciary capacity towards individuals and maintain reasonable security safeguards. It must also avoid conflicts of interest, publish its ownership and report audits to the Board. It may not sub-contract its obligations, or transfer control without the Board’s approval. Importantly, the Rules do not require any company to use a Consent Manager.

How it works: an illustration

Consider three fictional entities. ShopSaathi is an online marketplace with 30 crore customers, ConsentKavach is a registered Consent Manager, and PayLater Finance is ShopSaathi’s lending partner. ShopSaathi does not need consent to deliver, return or refund orders that its customer Priya has placed, because these fall under legitimate use in section 7(a). It does need consent for additional purposes: promotional messages, personalised recommendations, and sharing her purchase history with PayLater Finance for a buy-now-pay-later offer.

ShopSaathi first joins ConsentKavach’s platform and registers each purpose, the data involved and how long it is kept. When Priya signs up, ShopSaathi’s server sends a consent request to ConsentKavach. Priya is taken to the ConsentKavach app, logs in with an OTP and sees a plain-language notice covering the data, the purpose, the retention period and how to withdraw. When she taps “Allow”, ConsentKavach creates a digitally signed consent record. It sends ShopSaathi a confirmation with a consent ID, which ShopSaathi stores and checks before sending any promotion.

Six months later, Priya opens her ConsentKavach dashboard, which lists every company she has connected, and withdraws her consent to promotional messages. ConsentKavach marks the consent as revoked and immediately notifies ShopSaathi. ShopSaathi must stop the promotions, instruct its SMS vendor to stop, and confirm back. Withdrawal does not make earlier processing unlawful, but it must be as easy as giving consent.

For the lending use case, ShopSaathi encrypts Priya’s purchase history with a key that only PayLater Finance holds. ConsentKavach then passes the encrypted package on, like a courier carrying a sealed envelope. It knows who sent it, who received it and when, but not what is inside.

Does a Consent Manager hold its clients’ data?

No. A Consent Manager serving many companies does not take control of their customer databases. ConsentKavach stores Priya’s account details, the consent records, the notices she saw, and logs of withdrawals and data transfers. It neither stores nor can read her orders, addresses or payment details, or the contents of data exchanged between companies. The consent records are still personal data, however. Across many companies they become valuable metadata, showing whom a person deals with and when they withdraw. That metadata is where the real risks lie.

Liability of a Consent Manager

A Consent Manager is regulated in two capacities. As a registered Consent Manager, it is bound by the Act, Rule 4 and the First Schedule. Under section 27(1)(d), the Board may inquire into breaches of its registration conditions. It may then impose a penalty of up to ₹50 crore under the residuary entry of the Schedule to the Act, direct remedial action, or suspend or cancel the registration.

For its own account data and consent records, the Consent Manager decides why and how they are processed. In our view, that makes it a Data Fiduciary for that data. It is then exposed to penalties of up to ₹250 crore for failing to protect the records and up to ₹200 crore for failing to report a breach. It must also handle grievances under section 13. These figures are maximums; the actual amount is set under section 33(2). The Act provides no statutory compensation to individuals, but contractual and civil remedies remain.

Liability does not shift away from the companies that use a Consent Manager. Under section 6(10), a Data Fiduciary relying on consent must prove that notice was given and consent obtained. The Consent Manager’s records are strong evidence, not a shield. On withdrawal, the company must stop processing and ensure its processors do the same.

The commercial model

The Act and Rules are silent on how a Consent Manager earns money. The most likely model mirrors RBI’s Account Aggregator framework: companies pay, through onboarding fees, per-consent or per-event charges, or volume subscriptions, while individuals use the service free. Charging individuals is unlikely to reach scale. Existing Account Aggregators, consent-software vendors and IT firms may add Consent Manager arms. A subsidised public platform along the lines of DigiLocker has also been proposed. A Consent Manager cannot fund itself by selling or profiling data, since it cannot read the data and owes a fiduciary duty to the individual.

A common concern is that a platform with 30 crore customers would face fees of hundreds of crores a month, ultimately passed on to consumers. This overstates the cost. Fees arise when consent is given or changed, not every month. The often-quoted ₹5–15 per consent comes from Account Aggregators, where each consent pays for fetching and delivering financial data. A record that only captures consent would be far cheaper at scale. Legitimate uses such as fulfilling orders need no consent, and use of a Consent Manager is voluntary. A company that does not use one must still build its own consent system.

On illustrative figures, if all 30 crore customers gave three consents each at ₹10, the cost would be about ₹900 crore once, not monthly. At a consent-only price of 25 paise with 10% adoption, it would be about ₹2.25 crore once and well under ₹1 crore a year thereafter. The burden would become real only if Consent Managers were made mandatory, a few providers dominated, and prices followed data-transfer rates.

Critical practical challenges

Large companies may simply stay out. The Rules require a Consent Manager to serve only companies onboarded onto its platform, so a company that never joins one is never reached through one. Whether section 6(7) gives individuals an enforceable right to route consent through a Consent Manager is an open question. Large platforms have strong reasons to stay out. Consent rates drive revenue, so they want to control their own consent screens and keep their own data on how users respond. Many already run consent software built for the GDPR, and they do not want to depend on a third party whose registration could be suspended.

They are therefore likely to invest in consent-management software, which remains their own tool, rather than in registered Consent Managers. In that case, Consent Managers may take hold mainly in three areas: data flows between companies (in finance, health and insurance), small and mid-sized businesses, and sectors whose regulators require them. The idea of a single dashboard for all of a person’s consents may not materialise.

Group ownership creates conflicts of interest. Large conglomerates and IT companies are well placed to set up Consent Managers through subsidiaries or related entities. Those Consent Managers would then serve their group’s competitors. They could not read rivals’ customer data, but they would see which customers deal with a rival, what share of users accept its marketing, when withdrawals spike, and which partners it shares data with.

The Rules respond mainly through disclosure and internal controls. A Consent Manager must avoid conflicts with Data Fiduciaries and their management, prevent conflicts arising from its own directors’ interests, and publish shareholders above 2%. It must write these duties into its articles and obtain the Board’s approval for any change of control.

The gaps are significant. “Conflict of interest” is undefined, and nothing bars a Data Fiduciary’s group from owning a Consent Manager. The director-level rule may not catch a subsidiary with separate directors but a common parent, or holdings through step-down companies, trusts or nominees. Disclosure does not prevent ownership. Consent metadata is not expressly protected from use by the group, and nothing requires equal treatment in pricing, onboarding or dashboard design.

Rivals will likely refuse to join a competitor’s Consent Manager. That limits the conflict but splits the market into group-aligned platforms. Competition law is a backstop, not a substitute for clear rules.

Further challenges compound these. The duty not to read shared data sits uneasily with the duty to keep detailed seven-year records. Those records are themselves personal data, and the Rules barely address how they may be used. The Board has not yet published the interoperability and security standards that Consent Managers must be certified against, so “interoperable” remains an aspiration.

The framework also relies on judgement-based standards such as “sound” financial condition and “fairness and integrity”. These depend on the Board having the capacity to examine group structures and audit platforms, and public reports differ on how far its constitution has progressed. Finally, heavy fixed costs, voluntary demand and unregulated pricing may leave the field to large groups, which brings the conflict problem back.

What businesses and policymakers should do

Companies seeking registration should build their business case on fees paid by companies. They should target data flows between companies and small and mid-sized businesses rather than large consumer platforms. Group-owned applicants should go beyond the minimum. That means independent directors who do not sit on group fiduciaries’ boards, and infrastructure and staff separate from the group. It also means a written commitment not to use consent metadata, an equal and published fee schedule, and an encryption design that makes the no-read rule hold technically.

Companies choosing a Consent Manager should check its ownership disclosures for links to competitors. Their contracts should cover metadata confidentiality, equal treatment, audit rights, service levels on withdrawals, a right to exit on change of control, and access to records if the Consent Manager’s registration is suspended or cancelled. They should also keep their own records, because the burden of proof stays with them.

Large companies managing consent in-house are compliant if their records are complete. They should still design systems that can connect to Consent Managers later, in case a regulator or an amendment to the Rules requires it.

For policymakers, the first priority is to define conflict of interest to cover shareholders and group companies, and to consider shareholding caps similar to SEBI’s limits for stock exchanges and depositories. Consent metadata should be confined to providing the service, and equal treatment and published fees should be required. The Board should also publish interoperability standards promptly and coordinate with the Competition Commission of India on group-owned Consent Managers.

Conclusion

The Consent Manager is among the DPDP Act’s most ambitious ideas: a neutral, regulated intermediary that gives individuals one place to control their consents. The legal framework is in place and registration has opened. Its success will depend on whether large companies join, whether a sustainable fee model emerges, whether group-owned providers can be kept genuinely neutral, and whether the Board can supervise them. The months before the substantive obligations take effect in May 2027 are the window for businesses to make their choices and for regulators to close the gaps.

This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. It reflects the position as of 18 November 2026. For advice on Consent Manager registration or DPDP compliance, contact the Ductus Legal Data Privacy Practice.

Sources: MeitY press release, 14 November 2026; DPDP Rules, 2025, First Schedule; Rule 4, DPDP Rules, 2025; Bar & Bench; Artha Global; IT for Change submission on the draft Rules.

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